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Global energy governance 
Harald Heubaum 
The world economy is heavily reliant on the uninterrupted flow of energy. Without its mass production 
and consumption, there would be no modern economic growth and prosperity, no global trade in goods 
and services, no modern warfare, and no climate crisis threatening to undermine decades of human 
progress in health and development. Few countries are blessed with sufficient energy resources to fully 
meet the needs of their citizens, businesses and industry, and establishing a degree of energy security by 
gaining reliable and affordable access to these sources, especially fossil fuels, has come at a price. So 
have the impacts produced by fossil fuel combustion since the Industrial Revolution which can only be 
effectively addressed through a fundamental restructuring of the global economy.  
In short, energy as a policy issue cuts across a number of different dimensions and has been 
described as “among all policy fields exhibiting externalities of a global scale, by far the most complex, 
path dependent, and embedded.”1 Given its critical position at the very heart of global economics, politics 
and society, energy naturally lends itself to be governed at the global level. Yet such governance has so 
far remained largely elusive, with states jealously guarding their autonomy over energy policy and 
intergovernmental organizations operating in this field only recently starting to cooperate more closely.   
This chapter begins by charting the emergence of the existing global energy governance 
architecture, understood here as the “overarching system of public and private institutions that are valid or 
active” in the energy field.2 This architecture is fragmented in that it consists of different parts with often 
only little interaction, let alone integration, between them. The first section focuses on intergovernmental 
energy organizations which trace their origins to the post-WWII emergence of producers in the Global 
South; their challenge to the then dominant western oil majors; and the impact on oil-consuming 
advanced economies in the Global North of the former's clout in world politics of the 1970s. However, 
there are also other intergovernmental energy organizations, among them the International Renewable 
Energy Agency (IRENA), which form part of the architecture of global energy governance and will be 
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discussed here briefly. The chapter then proceeds to take a closer look at the UN and the role of several of 
its constituent parts in governing energy. The UN is often mistakenly overlooked in energy governance 
studies as it doesn’t have a dedicated energy program. However, the climate negotiation process 
coordinated by the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the 
2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the activities of the World Bank have direct and 
meaningful implications for energy policymaking and investment around the world. The third section 
examines the benefits and challenges of building a global energy governance architecture that is more 
integrated internally while at the same time better able to capitalize on overlaps and synergies with other 
global policy domains, especially those in climate change and international development. The chapter 
concludes with an assessment of the future of global energy governance, including the prospects for a 
World Energy Agency. 
 
The landscape of global energy governance 
The governance of energy encompasses multiple actors in both the public and private spheres, operating 
on different levels from the international to the local. States determine the legal and regulatory 
environment within which energy markets operate. Both states and companies cooperate across borders, 
for example in the trade of oil and natural gas via pipelines, and the construction of renewable or nuclear 
power plants. At the international level, however, there are governance problems and effective 
coordination has proved difficult. Since the 1960s and 1970s, the architecture of global energy 
governance has evolved in a way that is marked by horizontal fragmentation, with the establishment of a 
number of intergovernmental organizations set up to address different sets of concerns over the supply 
and demand of energy.  
Unlike the global climate governance architecture which revolves around the UNFCCC as its 
main pillar, there is currently no single, core institution in the field of global energy governance that 
incorporates (almost) all countries and has the power to help set binding rules and principles for its 
members. Instead, a division between oil-consuming advanced economies in the Global North and oil-
producing developing economies in the Global South has troubled global energy governance from the 
beginning, the former embodied in the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the latter represented by 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The antecedents of this split reach back 
to the early years of the twentieth century. In what became one of the major turning points of global 
history, oil was discovered in 1908 in southwest Iran by William Knox D’Arcy – later director of the 
newly-founded Anglo-Persian Oil Company – putting the Middle East on the energy map. 
 
Oil producers in the Global South 
Together with Royal Dutch Shell and the five largest American oil companies to have emerged from the 
breakup of Standard Oil in 1911, Anglo-Persian Oil (later renamed “British Petroleum” (BP)) formed a 
powerful cartel of multinational oil companies commonly referred to as the Seven Sisters.3 These seven 
companies came to dominate the global petroleum industry in the first half of the twentieth century, 
controlling the vast majority of global oil reserves as well as mid- and downstream assets.  The five 
American Sisters had built their power not on exploring and developing oil fields in the Middle East but 
on operations in the United States, then the world’s largest oil producer. From their home base, they used 
their wealth and political influence to fend off unwanted competition and deepen control over petroleum 
projects elsewhere. 
The Second World War fundamentally reshaped global geopolitics, laying the groundwork for a 
global energy governance architecture to emerge in the decades that followed. The rapid decline of the 
British Empire in particular had far-reaching consequences, with a large number of countries in the 
developing world gaining their independence, among them many of the oil-rich states of the Greater 
Middle East. OPEC was founded by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela in 1960 in Baghdad. 
Its goal was to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of the five founding members and support 
their economic interests on an international stage. In 1960, the Seven Sisters were still the key players in 
the global oil game but by the end of the decade, OPEC and especially Saudi Arabia with its large spare 
capacity, had replaced the United States as the global swing producer.  
The Sisters were in for trouble when in 1968, the OPEC cartel, now counting 10 members, 
published a Declaratory Statement underlining the right of states to fully control their domestic 
resources.4 This move towards resource sovereignty culminated in a wave of nationalizations of domestic 
oil industries beginning in the 1970s. Within years it would end the dominant position of western 
multinational oil companies, putting OPEC states firmly in charge of their own energy affairs. For many 
years afterwards, the organization’s influence derived from its ability to quickly curb or ramp up oil 
production and, due to its large share of global supplies, help determine oil prices.  
In 1973, Arab members of OPEC used this “oil weapon”, declaring an embargo against the United 
States and other western countries in response to their support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War.5 The 
resulting cut in oil production and increased costs had dramatic effects on oil-importing advanced 
economies, pushing many of them into recession. Since the 1990s, however, relations between oil 
producers in the Global South and consumers in the Global North have been less contentious, despite 
seismic events such as the 1990/91 Persian Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.    
OPEC today counts 13 members, representing the major oil producing countries in the Middle 
East, Africa and Latin America, and it is faced with a range of new challenges, among them the rise of 
non-OPEC oil producers, including the re-emergence of the United States as a leading shale oil producer. 
A period of high oil prices that began with a sudden spike – followed by an equally sudden temporary 
drop – at the height of the global financial crisis in 2008/09 incentivized increased production around the 
world. This revived the fortunes of previously uneconomic projects, made new exploration economically 
viable and provided additional volumes to the global oil market.  
It is, in large measure, because of these developments that OPEC’s ability to influence oil prices is 
today much reduced compared to the height of its power four decades ago. The growing urgency of 
addressing global climate change and the resulting need to shift energy systems away from a reliance on 
emissions-intensive hydrocarbons, too, is putting increasing pressure on the organization’s members. 
 
Oil consumers in the Global North 
The International Energy Agency (IEA), widely considered the key organization in the fragmented 
landscape of global energy governance, was established in 1974 as an autonomous organization within 
the framework of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), membership of 
which is a precondition for membership of the Agency. Its founding was a reaction to the 1973/74 oil 
crisis and the inability of the world’s major oil consumers in the OECD to effectively counter its impacts 
on their respective economies. OECD members initially failed to react in a coordinated fashion, engaging 
instead in a panicked stockpiling of oil reserves which drove costs up even further.6  
The IEA’s original role was, thus, to prevent similarly problematic behavior in the face of future 
oil supply crises. The IEA’s founding document lists the aims of the Agency as helping OECD countries 
develop self-sufficiency in oil in case of an emergency, establish oil demand limitation measures, gather 
and share information on developments in the international oil market, coordinate effective collective 
long-term responses to oil import dependence, and build closer relations between oil-consuming and oil-
producing countries.7 Today, the 29 member states are required to hold sufficient oil reserves to maintain 
consumption for at least 90 days without further oil imports.8 In the years since the IEA’s founding, oil 
from this strategic reserve has been released three times: at the outset of the 1991 Persian Gulf War; after 
Hurricane Katrina had wreaked havoc in the Gulf of Mexico, destroying critical oil production 
infrastructure in the process; and in 2011 in response to the civil war in Libyan and the bombing 
campaign led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under a UN mandate. 
However, the global energy landscape has changed considerably since the early 1970s, with oil 
retaining its critical importance for transportation but falling out of favor in the power sector. OECD 
members increasingly pursued policies aimed at incentivizing a greater diversity of energy sources and 
addressing new threats and opportunities beyond the petroleum industry. The IEA responded to these 
changes by broadening its approach, incorporating into its portfolio such issues as natural gas, nuclear 
power and, more recently, renewable energy sources, energy efficiency, sustainable development and 
environmental protection. In parallel, the Agency’s senior management has become more vocal over time, 
voicing strong support for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions in line with the targets spelled out 
in the Paris Agreement on climate change.9 But while these developments provide evidence for the IEA 
exercising its organizational autonomy in a fast-changing global policy environment, there are limits to 
what it can effectively achieve. Apart from its coordination during oil supply emergencies, the Agency’s 
main role is of an advisory, training and information-gathering nature. For example, it does not have 
authority over the domestic energy policies of its members on whom it also depends for the bulk of its 
budget – limitations it shares with other intergovernmental organizations populating the landscape of 
global energy governance. Further, the restrictions imposed on the Agency by its OECD-only 
membership risk leaving many of the world’s biggest energy consumers, including China and India, 
outside emerging governance arrangements, making it harder to move towards a more integrated 
architecture.    
 
Beyond the IEA-OPEC divide 
The global energy governance landscape also comprises a number of other, less well-known 
intergovernmental organizations, some of which straddle the divide between major oil producers in the 
Global South and oil-consuming advanced economies in the Global North. These include the Latin 
American Energy Organization (OLADE) founded in 1973, the Energy Charter Treaty (operational since 
1998) and the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) established in 2001. With its focus on renewable 
energy, IRENA joined the group of intergovernmental organizations working on energy in 2009. Of all 
the organizations focused on specific energy sources, IRENA has the broadest membership with 150 full 
state members and a further 30 candidates (as of June 2017). Headquartered in Abu Dhabi, it is the 
intergovernmental energy organization that most clearly transcends the North-South divide. The Agency 
is the only major international forum exclusively addressing renewable energy sources.  
Unlike the IEA which, by virtue of a broad-based portfolio, does not pick and choose particular 
energy technologies over others, IRENA was founded with the express goal of promoting the increased 
adoption of renewables around the world.10 This was in large part due to a sense of frustration among 
some of the founding states – Germany, Denmark and Spain – that the IEA, of which they are members, 
remained too closely wedded to fossil fuels and did not sufficiently acknowledge the growth and future 
potential of renewables such as wind and solar photovoltaics.11 However, compared to the more 
established intergovernmental energy organizations, IRENA has fewer staff and resources at its disposal, 
limiting its ability to play a greater role in the debate and make a more powerful case for a renewable 
energy transition.  
In addition, a number of intergovernmental organizations have emerged as important actors in 
global energy governance, even though they were not founded to specifically address energy issues. For 
example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (founded in 2001), whose primary focus is on 
strengthening mutual trust and friendship among its members and enhancing regional security, brings 
together a number of Asian energy-producing and consuming countries such as China, Russia and 
Kazakhstan. Its members have cooperated on a range of energy issues, particularly regarding fossil fuels. 
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) established its Energy Working Group in 1990, which 
has since met 47 times. APEC has also convened 12 Energy Ministerial Meetings since 1996 to discuss a 
range of issues such as energy infrastructure investment, oil prices, low-carbon sustainable energy 
development in the Asia-Pacific, or energy security and resilience, the focus of the 12th Energy 
Ministerial Meeting held in Cebu, the Philippines. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
has been involved in energy issues since the late 1990s, when it created the Centre for Energy to improve 
coordination and cooperation among its members in the energy field. The European Union (EU) has 
worked on the supranational level to coordinate energy policies among its member states through the 
Common Energy Policy and the 2015 Energy Union Strategy. Finally, the landscape of global energy 
governance is further populated by summit processes such as the G7/G8 and the G20, both of which have 
provided vital high-profile forums for the discussion of issues such as energy efficiency, the phasing out 
of fossil fuel subsidies and cutting carbon dioxide emissions.  
The large number of organizations in global energy governance makes a truly global approach to 
energy production and consumption – uniting producers and consumers in North and South under a 
shared set of rules and principles – next to impossible. A highly fragmented energy governance 
architecture also hinders moves to integrate and effectively coordinate responses to the intertwined 
challenges of energy security and climate change. Global energy governance is further complicated by 
vertical fragmentation, which plays an important role, notably regarding the often uneasy relationship 
between actors operating in global and regional energy markets and governments’ attempts to regulate 
their behavior at the domestic or supranational level.  
 
The United Nations 
While without a dedicated energy program, the UN nonetheless addresses energy with regards to 
economic, social and environmental sustainability through a number of different organizations and 
programs, including the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). The 
United Nations Statistics Division (UNSD) gathers energy statistics from over 190 countries, with a 
database reaching back to the 1950s. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been the focal 
point for international cooperation in the nuclear field since its founding in 1957, preceding the creation 
of OPEC and the IEA. As an autonomous intergovernmental forum within the UN family, the IAEA 
reports to both the General Assembly and the Security Council and it has played a critical role with 
regards to the safe and peaceful use of nuclear energy technologies and nuclear non-proliferation.12  
With the 2004 establishment of UN-Energy as a mechanism for inter-agency collaboration on 
energy issues, the UN has attempted to connect up its various internal activities. In theory, the creation of 
such a mechanism is useful if only to avoid duplication of efforts by different parts of the UN family and 
save scarce resources. However, UN-Energy has so far lacked the sustained high-level support to enable it 
to live up to its full intended purpose. Similarly, the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL) initiative 
launched in 2011 by then Secretary General Ban Ki-moon with the goal of achieving universal 
sustainable energy access had only little tangible impact until the adoption of the SDGs in 2015.  
 
Climate change negotiations 
International climate change negotiations take place under the roof of the UNFCCC, one of the outcomes 
of the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. Most accounts of global 
energy governance make no direct mention of the UNFCCC and the results the negotiation process has 
produced over the last two decades. And yet the Paris Agreement on climate change, as an international 
agreement within the UNFCCC, is, in its implications, the most profound and far-reaching energy – and 
economic – treaty the world has ever seen. Staying well below a 2°C rise in global average surface 
temperatures above pre-industrial levels, as prescribed by the agreement,13 requires a swift 
decarbonization of energy systems around the world, major changes in the production and consumption 
not just of energy but of goods more generally, and the mobilization of large amounts of public and 
private capital to achieve the necessary changes. The actions parties intend to take under the Paris 
Agreement, referred to as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), begin to spell out domestic 
pathways to collectively achieve global carbon neutrality by 2050, with a strong focus on transitioning 
away from emissions-intensive fossil fuels towards renewables and other low-carbon energy technologies 
such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) and nuclear power. This, in turn, has direct implications for all 
other aspects of global energy governance, emphasizing the need to understand energy and climate 
change as interconnected challenges.     
 The guarded optimism about this multilateral agreement, however, was dampened by the Trump 
administration’s June 2017 announcement that the United States would withdraw from the Paris 
Agreement. The decision will not go into effect until 2021, leaving the possibility for a return should a 
new US president be elected prior to that date. 
 
Sustainable development 
With the adoption of the SDGs, the UN has sought not only to continue and build on work left unfinished 
by the preceding Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), but also to expand the scope of measures 
needed “to free the human race from the tyranny of poverty and want and to heal and secure our planet.”14 
While the MDGs failed to mention energy at all, goal seven of the new SDGs concerns itself exclusively 
with affordable energy access, energy efficiency and clean energy infrastructure. Goal 13, with its focus 
on climate action addresses energy as the main source of GHG emissions and reiterates earlier calls for a 
further development of renewables.  
It has been argued that the majority of the SDGs are now either “wholly or partially concerned 
with managing resources, energy or climate change” given the strong environmental connotations of 
“sustainability.”15 Beyond mere semantics, however, the emphasis on energy and climate change is 
logical and consequential, as success in addressing many of the development goals and targets is directly 
dependent on the reliable provision of sufficient amounts of energy at affordable prices, and on whether 
or not the growth in global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions can be sufficiently reined in to slow the rise 
in global average surface temperatures.  
 With its focus on development support and poverty reduction in the Global South, the World Bank 
may not seem, at least initially, to be a key player in global energy governance. Yet due to the 
interconnection between energy provision and economic development, one of the Bank’s biggest budget 
lines has long been lending for energy infrastructure projects. Together with the closer integration and 
expansion of the climate change portfolio into its core agenda, the Bank, as part of the UN family, is a 
powerful player in supporting countries’ efforts to build greater domestic power generation capacity while 
transitioning towards a sustainable, low-carbon energy future.  
The SDGs are a reflection of a new reality in international development which acknowledges 
climate change and energy as key dimensions that need to be jointly addressed if there is to be meaningful 
progress overall. In this same vein, the activities of the World Bank are now unthinkable without a 
significant focus on the two interconnected issue areas. This is a change from the past when the Bank was 
widely criticized for investments in unsustainable high-emissions energy infrastructure, especially coal-
fired power generation. But in a sign of the changing times, in 2016 World Bank President Jim Yong Kim 
warned of the construction of further coal-fired power plants if GHG targets were to be met and the 
World Bank Group published a Climate Change Action Plan designed to help countries meet their NDCs 
and invest more heavily in low-carbon energy solutions in the period up to 2020.16 The Bank shares this 
new approach with other international financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
whose lending has shifted from support for fossil fuel projects towards renewables, energy efficiency and 
sustainable transport in line with new global priorities spelled out in the Paris Agreement and the SDGs.17 
 
Towards an integrated architecture? 
For global energy governance to be more effective, two main challenges need to be addressed going 
forward. First, the various intergovernmental organizations making up the energy landscape need to be 
integrated into a more coherent architecture. Second, the remaining divides between energy governance 
and other global governance fields, such as those in climate change and international development, need 
to be bridged further in order to capitalize on existing overlaps and synergies.  
Given the diversity of energy sources and technologies and the varied energy interests of states in 
the international system, a further integration and potential unification of the fragmented landscape of 
global energy governance can only occur around an intergovernmental organization or group of 
organizations that addresses the whole breadth and scope of energy policy today. This rules out OPEC as 
a suitable conduit for integration as its important but narrow focus on high-carbon petroleum products 
fails to adequately reflect the low-carbon direction of travel for the world’s energy systems. But while 
global power generation is diversifying and transitioning towards renewable sources in many countries, 
fossil fuels and nuclear power will continue to play an important role for some time to come, especially if 
technological innovations such as CCS can be cost-effectively applied at industrial scale. Therefore, even 
though IRENA will have a vital part to play in the global energy governance architecture, it, too, cannot 
currently serve as its main pillar. This leaves the IEA as the only widely respected and distinctly energy-
focused organization with a broad enough issue portfolio to potentially take on such a role. 
 
Integration within global energy governance 
One of the keys to unlocking greater integration within global energy governance is greater cooperation 
between the IEA and IRENA. The “salutary shock” provided by the creation of IRENA as a potential 
rival organization in 2009 had an undeniable impact on the IEA and led it to pay closer attention to 
renewable energy sources.18 Renewables play a much bigger role in the IEA’s issue portfolio today than 
ten years ago. Renewable technology reports acknowledging the rapid scaling up and increasing cost-
competitiveness of wind and solar PV are now issued on a regular basis. In early 2012, the two 
organizations signed an official partnership agreement, targeting the development and publication of the 
IEA/IRENA Global Renewable Energy Policies and Measures Database, cooperation in technology and 
innovation, and the sharing of renewable energy statistics. Both organizations have also held joint 
workshops and co-published a number of energy technology briefs. In early 2017, in a historic move, the 
IEA and IRENA published their first ever joint report focused on a global decarbonization of the energy 
sector. 
 Since the 1990s there has also been an improvement in relations between the IEA and OPEC. The 
organizations and their members cooperate via the International Energy Forum (IEF). Both the IEA and 
OPEC were founding members of the Joint Organizations Data Initiative which was created as a 
permanent mechanism by the IEF to arrive at more reliable statistics for petroleum and natural gas and 
also includes APEC, OLADE, the Statistical Office of the European Communities (EUROSTAT), GECF 
and UNSD. There are, however, limits to the partnership between the IEA and OPEC, as demonstrated in 
2011. As the war in Libya drove up global oil prices, there was a failure to coordinate a joint response to 
the events. Attempts by consumer countries to get OPEC to increase its oil production quotas failed, 
prompting the IEA to release 60 million barrels from emergency stocks over the period of thirty days. In 
response, OPEC Secretary General Abdullah al-Badri complained that strategic oil reserves should not be 
“used as a weapon against OPEC.”19 The dispute threatened the rapprochement between the organizations 
and served as a reminder of the potential for conflict in the fragmented global governance architecture.   
Although membership of the IEA is limited to OECD countries, the organization has recently 
stepped up cooperation with major non-member energy producers and consumers around the world, 
particularly its seven partner countries in the G20 – China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, South Africa 
and Russia – as well as with selected member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN).  This cooperation has gone beyond the issuing of occasional reports. The seven G20 partner 
countries actively participate in the IEA Ministerial Meeting which takes place every two years and sets 
broad strategic priorities for the Agency. The IEA’s data modelling and statistics courses are designed for 
and attended by government representatives from non-member countries. In late 2013, the IEA and its 
partner countries (with the exception of Mexico) issued a Joint Declaration on Association which stated 
their mutual interest “to pursue closer cooperation on the basis of a common understanding that global 
energy challenges and energy security require shared solutions by producer, consumer and transit 
countries.”20 Since 2015, China, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Morocco and India have all become 
Association countries in an important further step towards expanding the IEA’s reach beyond its 
traditional OECD membership and bridging the North-South divide. However, while ties have deepened 
with several major countries, they have threatened to break with others. The political fallout of the 
Ukraine crisis in 2014, the resulting sanctions imposed by western countries on Russia and a heated 
debate over the EU’s continued dependence on Russian gas have all undermined the growing relationship. 
 
Integration between different governance architectures 
While climate change wasn’t an issue occupying international policymakers’ attention in the infant days 
of global energy governance, it has since become a key determinant of policymaking around the world, 
reaching far beyond its more obvious environmental and energy policy implications. The 
intergovernmental organizations making up the global energy governance architecture have had to adjust 
to this new reality and address climate change as an integral part of their activities. The consequence has 
been a greater interaction and growing integration between global energy and global climate governance. 
With its focus on renewable energy technologies and advocacy for a sustainable, low-carbon energy 
future, IRENA has been a natural partner for the UNFCCC and the wider climate change field since its 
creation in 2009.  
In contrast, the IEA, as the significantly older and more established intergovernmental energy 
organization, underwent a period of transition to arrive in a similar place. The IEA significantly expanded 
its focus on climate change following the 2005 G8 summit at Gleneagles and now gathers CO2 emissions 
statistics, maintains a database on GHG emissions policies undertaken by member states and has devoted 
substantial and growing attention to the issue in all its World Energy Outlooks (WEO) – the organizations’ 
annual flagship publication – since 2008. The IEA’s leadership around Executive Director Fatih Birol and 
his predecessor Maria van der Hoeven became much more outspoken on climate change over time, 
making the case for an aggressive reduction of global GHG emissions in line with the 2˚C stabilization 
target spelled out in the Paris Agreement. The IEA now officially supports the UNFCCC in a number of 
its functions, including expert review of emissions data and climate policy measures, technical 
examination of decarbonization efforts and the mobilization of private capital for clean energy projects in 
developing countries. Like IRENA, the IEA is represented at Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to the 
UNFCCC and is a respected go-to for the kind of energy policy knowledge often lacking among many of 
the environmental experts supporting the climate convention process.  
 In the sustainable development arena, too, the cooperation between intergovernmental energy 
organizations and the UN family has increased over time. This is only logical considering IRENA’s 
global membership and the countries working with the IEA on an association basis. As a UN observer, 
IRENA works closely with UNDP and the World Bank, among others, with regards to financing of 
renewable energy projects and widening energy access in the developing world. The IEA has cooperated 
with UN actors on issues of energy poverty and universal energy access for years, drawing on its 
substantial work in the field since the 1990s, a cooperation boosted by the proclamation of the SDGs with 
their strong focus on energy and climate change. In addition, the heads of the IEA and the World Bank 
have both repeatedly called for an end to fossil fuel subsidies around the world, following a number of 
joint reports on the issue prepared for the G20 since the forum’s 2009 commitment to phase out such 
subsidies over the medium term. 
 
Conclusion 
The future of global energy governance remains uncertain. Since the 1960s, a fragmented landscape 
comprising a variety of different intergovernmental organizations has emerged which has lately shown 
movement towards greater cooperation and integration. Yet how far these developments may lead cannot 
yet be determined. Should there be a de facto or de jure “World Energy Agency”, either by adding new 
members (fully or on an association basis) to the IEA or should the Agency open up to all non-member 
countries, turning itself into a universal international organization? Would this improve the integration of 
the different organizations within the global energy governance architecture? Would it improve the 
integration of global energy and climate governance architectures? Would such a World Energy Agency 
need the power to set binding rules for its members and associated partners? Would countries willingly 
abide by those rules? Should a World Energy Agency be placed under the UN?  
Powerful obstacles currently impede the establishment of a World Energy Agency. These include 
membership in the OECD as a legal precondition for full membership in the IEA; continuing conflicts of 
interest between energy consumer and energy producer countries, with the latter continuing their 
cooperation in organizations such as OPEC; and the requirement for IEA member states to maintain and 
finance a costly strategic oil reserve. They also include the political rifts between major energy producers 
such as Russia and consumer countries in the OECD, which have surfaced in the last few years.  
However, it is not inconceivable that a World Energy Agency, for example as the result of a future 
merger between the IEA and IRENA, could be placed on a new legal footing with updated statutes and 
adjusted organizational structures fit for the twenty-first century. But doing so would be dependent on 
sufficient political will among current IEA and IRENA members to accept the newly-created Agency’s 
new role, and contribute to its success. In sum, from an aspirational perspective of effective global energy 
governance it seems desirable to have one single organization that covers all states, in the Global North 
and South, and that integrates all sources of energy. Yet given the various obstacles, path-dependencies, 
and lock-ins in current global energy governance, this seems far away. The IEA’s current strategy of 
slowly moving in this direction and adjusting its approach in response to a fast-changing global policy 
environment, forging partnerships with other intergovernmental organizations as well as with non-
member states, appears to be the next-best option, possibly leading to further integration and reform in the 
years to come. 
However, as the chapter has illustrated, the key players in global energy governance are not just 
intergovernmental organizations specifically focused on energy but also treaty processes such as the 
UNFCCC and internationally-agreed agendas such as the SDGs. The Paris Agreement on climate change 
would not normally be studied as an important part of the global energy governance architecture and yet 
its implications for energy systems and energy policymaking around the world – with or without the 
participation of the United States – reach far beyond the impact currently enjoyed by any of the major 
intergovernmental energy organizations. Likewise, the SDGs and, by extension the multilateral 
development banks working to deliver the ambitious new development agenda, are critically important if 
energy security and low-carbon energy transitions are to become a reality in the poorer states of the 
Global South as much as in the wealthier Global North. Therefore, a more holistic view of global energy 
governance is required. It should incorporate the various key actors and agreements that shape outcomes 
in this field regardless on which governance architecture they may be built. 
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